Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=881803
 
 

References (49)



 
 

Citations (31)



 


 



Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms


Alberto F. Alesina


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Silvia Ardagna


National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Goldman Sachs - London

Francesco Trebbi


University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

February 2006

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2108

Abstract:     
Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with 'strong' governments, (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 7, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Ardagna, Silvia and Trebbi, Francesco, Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms (February 2006). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2108. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=881803 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.881803

Contact Information

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Silvia Ardagna
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Goldman Sachs - London ( email )
130 Peterborough Court
133 Fleet Street
London, EC4A 2BB
United Kingdom
Francesco Trebbi
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Economics ( email )
997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/ftrebbi/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 965
Downloads: 190
Download Rank: 74,127
References:  49
Citations:  31

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.360 seconds