Footnotes (103)



Privatization: The Road to Democracy?

Carol M. Rose

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law

September 2005

Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 06-11
Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 106

Privatization has been something of a watchword in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union. The rationales for privatization are usually economic, stressing the comparative advantage of market regimes over bureaucratic ones: that private property gives owners the incentives to make better investment decisions, and that a market economy is more flexible and nimble in satisfying people's wants.

This article, however, leaves the economic arguments to one side and instead takes up the political arguments for privatization, many of which have a long history. The paper maps modern deregulatory efforts onto a series of six longstanding arguments to the effect that property and commerce are the most important rights of all in supporting democratic governance; the idea is to see whether the modern efforts tend to confirm or disconfirm the arguments for private property's centrality in a democracy. The paper concludes that the picture is somewhat mixed: some privatization measures support the political arguments for property, while others do not. The lesson is that political reform cannot rest on property and privatization alone, but needs to take place on a variety of fronts, of which, of course, privatization may be an important component.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: privatization, property, political reform

working papers series

Download This Paper

Date posted: February 9, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Rose, Carol M., Privatization: The Road to Democracy? (September 2005). Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 06-11; Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 106. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=881877 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.881877

Contact Information

Carol Marguerite Rose (Contact Author)
University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States
520-621-5544 (Phone)
520-621-9140 (Fax)

Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,500
Downloads: 454
Download Rank: 32,902
Footnotes:  103

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.438 seconds