Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=882916
 
 

References (12)



 
 

Citations (28)



 


 



Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation


Gilles Saint-Paul


University of Toulouse I - GREMAQ-IDEI; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

February 1996

IMF Working Paper No. 96/16

Abstract:     
We develop a model to analyze the implications of firing costs on incentives for R & D and international specialization. The key idea is that, to avoid paying firing costs, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country and then move to the high firing cost country. We show that in the closed economy, an increase in firing costs does not necessarily imply a reduction in R & D; it crucially depends on the riskiness of R & D activity relative to production activity. In the open economy, however, an increase in firing cost is much more likely to reduce R & D intensity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

JEL Classification: F12, F17, J21, J32, O3

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: February 15, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Saint-Paul, Gilles, Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation (February 1996). IMF Working Paper No. 96/16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=882916

Contact Information

Gilles Saint-Paul (Contact Author)
University of Toulouse I - GREMAQ-IDEI ( email )
Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 5 6112 8544 (Phone)
+33 5 6122 5563 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 402
Downloads: 47
References:  12
Citations:  28

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.344 seconds