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Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions


Alberto F. Alesina


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Roberto Perotti


Bocconi University - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

May 1996

IMF Working Paper No. 96/52

Abstract:     
By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area and suggest several open and unresolved issue. We also examine the empirical evidence drawn from studies on samples of OECD countries, Latin American countries and the United States. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of this literature and with some concrete proposals.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

JEL Classification: H1, H5

working papers series


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Date posted: February 15, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Perotti, Roberto, Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions (May 1996). IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-36, 1996. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=882952

Contact Information

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Roberto Perotti
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )
Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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