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Towards a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Lucian's Solution for Improving Corporate America


Leo E. Strine Jr.


Government of the State of Delaware - Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School

February 13, 2006

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 541

Abstract:     
In this essay, Vice Chancellor Strine responds to Professor Bebchuk's proposal to empower stockholders to amend corporate charters. Critiquing that proposal from the perspective of a corporate law traditionalist, Strine notes that traditionalists will fear that the proposal will undermine managerial flexibility and will give clout to unaccountable institutional intermediaries. In a more constructive vein, the essay posits a reform of the corporate election system designed to address the legitimate concerns raised in Professor Bebchuk's thought-provoking article but in a traditionalist manner more consistent with the republican model of corporate democracy characteristic of American corporate law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: corporate governance, shareholders, managers, directors, boards, proxy contests, precatory resolutions, corporate charters, corporate elections

JEL Classification: D70, G30, K22

working papers series


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Date posted: February 14, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Strine , Leo E., Towards a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Lucian's Solution for Improving Corporate America (February 13, 2006). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 541. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=883720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.883720

Contact Information

Leo E. Strine Jr. (Contact Author)
Government of the State of Delaware - Supreme Court of Delaware ( email )
820 N. French Street
P.O. Box 1997
Wilmington, DE 19801
United States
Harvard Law School ( email )
1563 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
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