Redistribution and Crime when Agents have Limited Liability: A Note
University of Eastern Piedmont -A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice
University of Eastern Piedmont - A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice
Review of Law & Economics, Forthcoming
Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.
Keywords: Crime, Limited Liability, Income Transfers
JEL Classification: K42, H23, I38Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 22, 2008
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