Abstract

  


 



Redistribution and Crime when Agents have Limited Liability: A Note


Alberto Cassone


University of Eastern Piedmont -A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice

Carla Marchese


University of Eastern Piedmont - A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice

Review of Law & Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

Keywords: Crime, Limited Liability, Income Transfers

JEL Classification: K42, H23, I38

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: July 22, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Cassone, Alberto and Marchese, Carla, Redistribution and Crime when Agents have Limited Liability: A Note. Review of Law & Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=884340

Contact Information

Alberto Cassone
University of Eastern Piedmont -A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice ( email )
Via Cavour 84
15100 Alessandria, 10129
Italy
+390131283714 (Phone)
+390131283704 (Fax)
Carla Marchese (Contact Author)
University of Eastern Piedmont - A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice ( email )
Via Cavour 84
15100 Alessandria
Italy
+39-131-283718 (Phone)
+39-131-283704 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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