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On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals - 'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation Exploitation Strategy


Markus G. Reitzig


University of Vienna

Joachim Henkel


TUM School of Management - Technische Universität München (TUM) ; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Christopher Heath


European Patent Office



Abstract:     
Patent trolls (or sharks) are small patent holding individuals or firms who trap R&D intense manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms within a game-theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts' unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Patent, patent shark, patent troll, damage award, infringement

JEL Classification: M00, M11, M21, K00, K11, K33

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Date posted: February 28, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Reitzig, Markus G., Henkel, Joachim and Heath, Christopher, On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals - 'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation Exploitation Strategy. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=885914 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.885914

Contact Information

Markus G. Reitzig (Contact Author)
University of Vienna ( email )
Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, 1090
Austria
Joachim Henkel
TUM School of Management - Technische Universität München (TUM) ( email )
Arcisstr. 21
Munich, D-80333
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Christopher Heath
European Patent Office ( email )
Munich
Germany
+498923993130 (Phone)
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