A Mechanism for Allocating Objects in a Network of Symmetric Caches
6 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2006
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze object allocation in a network of caches that share web content to exploit network externality benefits. The analysis is presented for both centralized and decentralized scenarios, and is carried out using operations research and game-theoretic tools. The optimal allocation is found for each case, and cache incentives are aligned with the socially optimal welfare by devising appropriate pricing mechanisms.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Tawarmalani, Mohit and Kannan, Karthik Natarajan and De, Prabuddha, A Mechanism for Allocating Objects in a Network of Symmetric Caches. 15th Annual Workshop on Information Technolgies & Systems (WITS) Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=885925 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.885925
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