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Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model


Jordi Galí


Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Olivier J. Blanchard


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); International Monetary Fund (IMF)

December 2005

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5375

Abstract:     
Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non-trivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation-unemployment relation found in the data.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Oil price shocks, inflation targeting, monetary policy, inflation inertia

JEL Classification: E32, E50

working papers series


Date posted: February 22, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Galí, Jordi and Blanchard, Olivier J., Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model (December 2005). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5375. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=885959

Contact Information

Jordi Gali (Contact Author)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI) ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2754 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1746 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~gali
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Olivier J. Blanchard
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )
Room E52-357
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-8891 (Phone)
617-253-4096 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mit.edu/blanchar/www/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202 623 7825 (Phone)
202 623 7271 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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