The Economics of Treaty Ratification
George Washington University - Department of Economics
University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna
February 21, 2006
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-02
Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Forthcoming
In this paper we study the strengths and weaknesses of the matching-reservations mechanism introduced by Article 21 of the Vienna Convention. When states face asymmetric incentives, the rules introduced by the Vienna Convention may not discourage all reservations. We also analyze the welfare properties of the matching-reservations outcomes generated by Article 21 when such asymmetric incentives are at work. We show that Article 21 provides quite an effective solution to the prisoner's dilemma problem, but does not always induce socially optimal levels of ratification. A social optimum will be achieved under Article 21 only in the limited subset of cases where signatory states have homogeneous payoff functions, or when all states prefer full ratification, despite the differences in the incentives that they face.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: Reservations, Treaty ratification, Vienna Convention
JEL Classification: D70, K10, K33
Date posted: February 21, 2006 ; Last revised: September 8, 2008
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