Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=886112
 
 

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The Economics of Treaty Ratification


Vincy Fon


George Washington University - Department of Economics

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

February 21, 2006

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-02
Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
In this paper we study the strengths and weaknesses of the matching-reservations mechanism introduced by Article 21 of the Vienna Convention. When states face asymmetric incentives, the rules introduced by the Vienna Convention may not discourage all reservations. We also analyze the welfare properties of the matching-reservations outcomes generated by Article 21 when such asymmetric incentives are at work. We show that Article 21 provides quite an effective solution to the prisoner's dilemma problem, but does not always induce socially optimal levels of ratification. A social optimum will be achieved under Article 21 only in the limited subset of cases where signatory states have homogeneous payoff functions, or when all states prefer full ratification, despite the differences in the incentives that they face.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Reservations, Treaty ratification, Vienna Convention

JEL Classification: D70, K10, K33

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Date posted: February 21, 2006 ; Last revised: September 8, 2008

Suggested Citation

Fon, Vincy and Parisi, Francesco, The Economics of Treaty Ratification (February 21, 2006). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-02; Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=886112

Contact Information

Vincy Fon (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )
2115 G Street, N.W.
Monroe Hall, #366
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7580 (Phone)
202-994-6147 (Fax)
Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
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