Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?

Michel Kerf

World Bank - Infrastructure Department

Isabel Neto

World Bank

Damien Geradin

George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

February 2005

Among the countries that have fully liberalized their telecommunications sector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules often (but not always) applied by sector-specific institutions, while others have focused mainly on economy-wide antitrust rules and institutions to control market power in that sector. This note describes the choices made in that respect by Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the UK and the US. It then attempts to draw lessons from the experiences of those countries on whether antitrust or sector-specific processes appear to deal with key regulatory issues most quickly and effectively. A second note will discuss the same question in more details focusing specifically on the regulation of interconnection. Finally, a third note will discuss whether choosing the "right" balance between antitrust and sector-specific regulation appears to translate into a higher degree of competitiveness in the various segments of the telecommunications market.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Keywords: telecommunications, antitrust, competition law, regulation, interconnection, Australia, United Kingdon, United States, New Zealand, Chile, dominance

JEL Classification: L12, L22, L41, L43, L50, L96, D42, K21

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Date posted: March 1, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Kerf, Michel and Neto, Isabel and Geradin, Damien, Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best? (February 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=886292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886292

Contact Information

Michel Kerf (Contact Author)
World Bank - Infrastructure Department ( email )
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Isabel Neto
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Damien Geradin
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)
Tilburg, 5000 LE
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