Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=886305
 


 



Antitrust vs. Sector Specific Regulation in Telecom: A Close Look at Interconnection


Damien Geradin


George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Covington & Burling LLP

Isabel Neto


World Bank

Michel Kerf


World Bank - Infrastructure Department

February 2005


Abstract:     
In a companion note (Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?), we argued that while the full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying to a large extent on general antitrust rules and institutions as instruments of economic regulation, some sector-specific rules and specialized implementing institutions are still likely to be needed - at least for some time after liberalization - in a number of areas, including interconnection. In the present note, we look in more details at the regulation of interconnection drawing from the experience of New Zealand which fully liberalized its telecommunications markets in the late 1980's and relied primarily on antitrust instruments to regulate interconnection until 2001 when it introduced a new regime with heavier emphasis on sector-specific regulation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: telecommunications, antitrust, interconnection, regulation, competition law, access pricing, New Zealand, LRIC, ECPR, Internet, broadband

JEL Classification: L12, L22, L41, L43, L50, L96, D42, K21

working papers series





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Date posted: March 1, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and Neto, Isabel and Kerf, Michel, Antitrust vs. Sector Specific Regulation in Telecom: A Close Look at Interconnection (February 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=886305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886305

Contact Information

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason Law School Logo

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
Covington & Burling LLP ( email )
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2401
United States
Isabel Neto
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Michel Kerf
World Bank - Infrastructure Department ( email )
Washington, DC 20433
United States
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