Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=886316
 


 



Antitrust vs. Sector Specific Regulation in Telecom: The Impact on Competitiveness


Michel Kerf


World Bank - Infrastructure Department

Isabel Neto


World Bank

Damien Geradin


George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Covington & Burling LLP

2005


Abstract:     
This note analyses the competitiveness of different segments of the telecommunications markets in the five countries (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Chile) shows that those countries that have relied on a proper balance between antitrust and sector-specific regulation have, on the whole, more competitive telecom markets. The market for fixed local services is, however, a separate case. There, the balance between antitrust and sector-specific regulation matters much less than the fact that prices have in many instances been set below costs with the result that the potential for competition in the provision of fixed local services does not exist.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, telecommunications, prices, competitiveness, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Chile

JEL Classification: L12, L22, L41, L43, L50, L96, D42, K21

working papers series





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Date posted: March 2, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Kerf, Michel and Neto, Isabel and Geradin, Damien, Antitrust vs. Sector Specific Regulation in Telecom: The Impact on Competitiveness (2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=886316 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886316

Contact Information

Michel Kerf
World Bank - Infrastructure Department ( email )
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Isabel Neto
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Damien Geradin (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason Law School Logo

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
Covington & Burling LLP ( email )
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2401
United States
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