Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=886901
 
 

References (34)



 
 

Citations (10)



 


 



Big Business Owners in Politics


Pramuan Bunkanwanicha


ESCP Europe

Yupana Wiwattanakantang


National University of Singapore - Department of Finance/Strategy and Policy

December 18, 2007

AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper
EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings

Abstract:     
This paper investigates a little studied but common mechanism that firms use to obtain state favors: business owners themselved seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that the more business owners rely on government conccessions or the wealthier they are, the more likely they are to run for top office. Once in power, the market valuation of their firms increase dramatically. Surprisingly, the political power does not influence the financing strategies of their firms. Instead, business owners in top office use their policy-decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. Such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but also foreign investors. As a result, these political connected firms are able to seize more market share.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Political connections, Family firms, Corporate Governance, Emerging Economies

JEL Classification: G15, G34, G38, K23

working papers series





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Date posted: February 27, 2006 ; Last revised: January 2, 2008

Suggested Citation

Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan and Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, Big Business Owners in Politics (December 18, 2007). AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper; EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=886901 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886901

Contact Information

Pramuan Bunkanwanicha (Contact Author)
ESCP Europe ( email )
79 Avenue de la Republique
Paris, 75011
France
Yupana Wiwattanakantang
National University of Singapore - Department of Finance/Strategy and Policy ( email )
Business School
Mochtar Riady Building #7-44, 15 Kent Ridge Dri
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
65-6516-1912 (Phone)
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