Thomas H. Lee
Fordham University School of Law; Harvard Law School
Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74, 2006
Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 06-109
The seeming oxymoron of the title describes a preference for more popularly responsive rule, i.e., federalism, but by the least democratic subnational governmental unit-state judiciaries. In this short essay, Professor Lee introduces the concept of countermajoritarian federalism and suggests that it may explain Justice Stevens' jurisprudence of federalism.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: federalism, Justice Stevens, state judges
JEL Classification: K1, K2, K3, K4Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 2, 2006
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