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Countermajoritarian Federalism


Thomas H. Lee


Fordham University School of Law; Harvard Law School

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74, 2006
Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 06-109

Abstract:     
The seeming oxymoron of the title describes a preference for more popularly responsive rule, i.e., federalism, but by the least democratic subnational governmental unit-state judiciaries. In this short essay, Professor Lee introduces the concept of countermajoritarian federalism and suggests that it may explain Justice Stevens' jurisprudence of federalism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: federalism, Justice Stevens, state judges

JEL Classification: K1, K2, K3, K4

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Date posted: March 2, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Lee, Thomas H., Countermajoritarian Federalism. Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74, 2006; Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 06-109. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=887163

Contact Information

Thomas H. Lee (Contact Author)
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
Harvard Law School ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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