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A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

Drew Fudenberg
Harvard University - Department of Economics

David K. Levine
University of California, Los Angeles - Department of Economics


March 2006

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2112

Abstract:     
We propose that a simple 'dual-self' model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O'Donoghue and Rabin models of hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist. Finally, the reduced form of the base version of our model is consistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer axions.

Note: A previous version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=617522

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 07, 2006 ; Last revised: March 28, 2006

Suggested Citation

Fudenberg , Drew and Levine, David K., A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (March 2006). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2112. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=888752


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Contact Information

Drew Fudenberg (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Room 310
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-5895 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
David K. Levine
University of California, Los Angeles - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 951477
8283 Bunche
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States
310-825-3810 (Phone)
310-825-9528 (Fax)
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