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Payout Policy Pedagogy: What Matters and Why

Harry DeAngelo
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department

Linda DeAngelo
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department


August 2006


Abstract:     
This paper argues that we should abandon MM (1961) irrelevance as the foundation for teaching payout policy, and instead emphasize the need to distribute the full value generated by investment policy ("full payout"). Because MM's assumptions restrict payouts to an optimum, their irrelevance theorem does not provide the appropriate prescription for managerial behavior. A simple example clarifies why the correct prescription is "full payout," and why both payout and investment policy matter even absent agency costs (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006)). A simple life-cycle generalization explains the main stylized facts about the payout policies of U.S. and European firms.

Keywords: Payout policy, dividends, capital budgeting, corporate finance

JEL Classifications: G35, G31

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 16, 2006 ; Last revised: May 12, 2009

Suggested Citation

DeAngelo, Harry and DeAngelo, Linda, Payout Policy Pedagogy: What Matters and Why (August 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=890616


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Contact Information

Harry DeAngelo (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )
Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6541 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)
Linda DeAngelo
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )
Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-3868 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)
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