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Competition and Private Benefits of Control


Maria Guadalupe


INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Francisco Perez-Gonzalez


Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

October 1, 2010

AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the impact of competition on private benefits of control (PBC). To test for the effect of competition on private benefits, we use two indexes that measure the level of product and input market anti-competitive regulations. We estimate PBC using the voting premia between shares with differential voting rights. Using a panel dataset of 586 firms in 16 countries, our main findings are three. First, within-country increases in the intensity of competition lead to lower estimates of private benefits of control. Second, competition significantly reduces the dispersion in private benefits. Third, the reduction in the level and dispersion of PBC that result from competition are particularly prominent in weak-rule-of-law countries, in manufacturing industries and in less-profitable firms. Overall, our results suggest that product market competition can help in curbing private benefits of control.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Private benefits of control, product market competition, governance

JEL Classification: G30, G15, D40

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Date posted: March 15, 2006 ; Last revised: July 18, 2011

Suggested Citation

Guadalupe, Maria and Perez-Gonzalez, Francisco, Competition and Private Benefits of Control (October 1, 2010). AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=890814 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890814

Contact Information

Maria Guadalupe (Contact Author)
INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Francisco Perez-Gonzalez
Stanford University ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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