Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=890829
 
 

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Citations (247)



 


 



Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?


Xavier Gabaix


New York University - Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Augustin Landier


Toulouse School of Economics

March 14, 2006

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 06-13
AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
This paper develops a simple competitive model of CEO pay. A large part of the rise in CEO compensation in the US economy is explained without assuming managerial entrenchment, mishandling of options, or theft. CEOs have observable managerial talent and are matched to assets in a competitive assignment model. The marginal impact of a CEO's talent is assumed to increase with the value of the assets under his control. Under very general assumptions, using results from extreme value theory, the model determines the level of CEO pay across firms and over time, and the pay-sensitivity relations. The model predicts the cross-sectional Cobb-Douglas relation between pay and firm size. It also predicts that the level of CEO compensation should increase one for one with the average market capitalization of large firms in the economy. Therefore, the five-fold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2000 can be fully attributed to the increase in market capitalization of large US companies. The model can also be used to study other large changes at the top of the income distribution, and offers a benchmark for calibratable corporate finance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Executive compensation, wage distribution, Pareto distribution, wage inequality, assignment, incentives, pay performance sensitivity, human capital

JEL Classification: D2, D3, G34, J3

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Date posted: May 17, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Gabaix, Xavier and Landier, Augustin, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? (March 14, 2006). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 06-13; AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=890829 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890829

Contact Information

Xavier Gabaix (Contact Author)
New York University - Stern School of Business ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~xgabaix/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Augustin Landier
Toulouse School of Economics ( email )
Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
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References:  60
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