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http://ssrn.com/abstract=891192
 
 

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Private Information and Bargaining Power in Venture Capital Financing


Yrjo Koskinen


Boston University - School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Michael J. Rebello


University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Jun Wang


City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

February 28, 2013

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We model the natural evolution of private information over the life of a venture capitalist financed project. In the early stages, the entrepreneur is better informed regarding the project, and when the project matures, the venture capitalist has an informational advantage over the entrepreneur. Within this framework, we examine how the venture capitalist's relative bargaining power affects cash flow rights and investment. When the bargaining advantage lies with the entrepreneur, the project may not be screened, and the venture capitalist may acquiesce to excessive initial investment but subsequently terminate the project. Increased venture capitalist bargaining power encourages project screening, attenuates the incentive to overinvest, and reduces the incidence of project termination subsequent to the initial investment. The payoff sensitivity of venture capitalist's financing contract also increases as his bargaining power improves.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Venture capital, Asymmetric information, Bargaining power, Financial contracting, Investment distortions

JEL Classification: G24, G32, D82

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: March 4, 2008 ; Last revised: June 7, 2013

Suggested Citation

Koskinen, Yrjo and Rebello, Michael J. and Wang, Jun, Private Information and Bargaining Power in Venture Capital Financing (February 28, 2013). Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=891192 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.891192

Contact Information

Yrjo Koskinen (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-9775 (Phone)
617-353-6667 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://smgnet.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/KoskinenYrjo.html
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom
Michael J. Rebello
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
Jun Wang
City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )
17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States
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