Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482
 
 

References (43)



 
 

Citations (87)



 


 



Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?


I. J. Alexander Dyck


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Adair Morse


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

October 1, 2008

AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper
Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 08-22
CRSP Working Paper No. 618
1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 156/2007

Abstract:     
To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud we study in depth all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on obvious actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but takes a village of several non-traditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Having access to information or monetary rewards has a significant impact on the probability a stakeholder becomes a whistleblower. Reputational incentives do not work as well. Yet, after SOX auditors' reputation pays off in new client business, increasing their willingness to reveal fraud.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Whistleblowers, Corporate Scandals, Corporate Governance, Fraud, Gatekeepers

JEL Classification: G30, K20

working papers series


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Date posted: March 15, 2006 ; Last revised: April 14, 2011

Suggested Citation

Dyck, I. J. Alexander and Morse, Adair and Zingales, Luigi, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (October 1, 2008). AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper; Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 08-22; CRSP Working Paper No. 618; 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 156/2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.891482

Contact Information

I.J. Alexander Dyck
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada
416-946-0819 (Phone)
Adair Morse (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Luigi Zingales
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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