Do More Reputable Financial Institutions Reduce Earnings Management by IPO Issuers?
Kyung Hee University
Ronald W. Masulis
University of New South Wales - Australian School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN)
March 29, 2011
Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming
This study investigates whether financial intermediaries (FIs) participating in the IPO process play a significant role in restraining earnings management (EM). Specifically, we examine whether EM around IPOs is negatively related to investment banks (IBs) and venture capital (VC) investor reputations. In general, we do not find evidence that VCs as a group significantly restrain EM by IPO issuers. However, we uncover strong evidence that more reputable VCs and IBs are associated with significantly less EM, which is consistent with them implicitly certifying the quality of issuer financial reports. Moreover, a stronger reduction in EM is found when more reputable IBs are matched with more reputable VCs, which indicates that VC and IB reputation are complements rather than substitutes. These conclusions are invariant to adjustments for potential endogeneity of underwriter reputation and VC-backing or reputation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Keywords: Underwriting, Venture Capital, IPO, Earnings Management, Propensity Score Matching
JEL Classification: D82, G14, G24, G32, D82, M13, M41
Date posted: March 24, 2008 ; Last revised: March 31, 2011
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