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Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Systems


Koji Takamiya


Osaka University

Akira Tanaka


Hokkaido University
March 2, 2006

Osaka University Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 653

Abstract:     
This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting systems, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We point out that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.

Keywords: computational complexity, NP-completeness, simple game, core, stability, Nakamura number

JEL Classification: C71, D71

working papers series


Date posted: March 29, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Takamiya, Koji and Tanaka, Akira, Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Systems (March 2, 2006). Osaka University Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 653. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=893667

Contact Information

Koji Takamiya (Contact Author)
Osaka University ( email )
1-1 Yamadaoka
Suita
Osaka, 565-0871
Japan
Akira Tanaka
Hokkaido University ( email )
５ Kita 8 Jonishi, Kita Ward
Hokkaido Prefecture
Sapporo, 060-0808
Japan
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