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On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.'s 'Anti-Director Rights Index' under Consistent Coding

Holger Spamann
Harvard University - Harvard Law School


March 2006

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 7
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 67/2006

Abstract:     
I re-code the "Antidirector Rights Index" (ADRI) of shareholder protection rules from La Porta et al. 1998 for 46 countries in 1997 and 2005 with the help of local lawyers. My emphasis is on consistent coding; I do not change the original variable definitions. Consistently coded ADRI values are neither distributed with significant differences between Common and Civil Law countries, nor predictive of stock market outcomes. The revision of the variable definitions in Djankov et al. 2005 salvages some of the original results, but reinforces severe endogeneity concerns regarding the index components that drive the remaining significant results. I review the other index components and conclude that the ADRI is unlikely to be a valid measure of shareholder protection. Results derived with the ADRI in the literature may have to be revisited. Along the way, I develop some general guidelines for consistent coding.

JEL Classifications: G38, K22, P48

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 04, 2006 ; Last revised: June 02, 2006

Suggested Citation

Spamann, Holger, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.'s 'Anti-Director Rights Index' under Consistent Coding (March 2006). Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 7; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 67/2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=894301


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Holger Spamann (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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