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Bond Underwriting Fees and Keiretsu Affiliation in Japan


Abe De Jong


Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management

Peter Roosenboom


Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

Willem Schramade


Erasmus University, School of Economics; Robeco


Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Forthcoming
ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS 2005 038 F&A

Abstract:     
We examine fees on bonds issued by Japanese corporations during the 1994-2002 period. Over time, we find that fees have increased for those firms that are related to bank-led (financial) keiretsu, even after controlling for risk factors. During the same period, fees have fallen for firms not belonging to keiretsu. The higher fees for keiretsu firms were not offset by lower yields. It seems that, against the background of bond market deregulation and weaker banks, keiretsu membership has become a burden rather than an advantage.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Fees, bonds, keiretsu, corporate groups, banks

JEL Classification: G20, G21, G24, G30

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: April 4, 2006  

Suggested Citation

De Jong, Abe, Roosenboom, Peter and Schramade, Willem, Bond Underwriting Fees and Keiretsu Affiliation in Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Forthcoming; ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS 2005 038 F&A. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=894605

Contact Information

Abe De Jong
Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
Room T09-53
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 408 1022 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://web.eur.nl/fbk/dep/dep5/faculty/ajong
Peter Roosenboom
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
Room T09-56
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 40 82255 (Phone)
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Willem Schramade (Contact Author)
Erasmus University, School of Economics ( email )
Netherlands
+31-10-4081507 (Phone)
Robeco ( email )
Rotterdam, 3011 AG
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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