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http://ssrn.com/abstract=895723
 
 

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Conditions for Judicial Independence


McNollgast


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Division of Social Sciences


Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-43

Abstract:     
Judicial dependence is much discussed in political science and law, but the definitions are often contradictory or inconsistent. Instead of defining judicial independence as a permanent feature of the institutional environment, we develop a model in which judicial independence is an equilibrium outcome of a game between the judiciary, legislature and executive. Accordingly, the independence of the judiciary varies with changes in the composition of the branches of government. This approach to judicial independence helps to explain some of the major confrontations between the judiciary and other branches of government in both the United States and other countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: judicial independence, congressional oversight, federal courts

JEL Classification: K00, K41

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Date posted: April 8, 2006  

Suggested Citation

McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence. Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-43. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=895723

Contact Information

McNollgast (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Division of Social Sciences ( email )
United States
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