Costly Information, Entry, and Credit Access
Todd A. Gormley
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
September 23, 2013
Using a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric information and differing comparative advantages among lenders, this paper analyzes the impact of lender entry on credit access. The model shows that lender entry has the potential to create a segmented market. This segmentation increases credit access for those firms targeted by the new lenders but potentially reduces credit access for all other firms. The overall impact on net output depends on the distribution of firms, the relative costs of lenders, and the cost of acquiring information. The model provides new insights into the evidence regarding foreign lenders’ entry into emerging markets.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Competition, Credit, Financial Liberalization
JEL Classification: D82, F3, G2, O16, O19working papers series
Date posted: April 18, 2006 ; Last revised: September 23, 2013
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.672 seconds