Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=896068
 
 

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Why Does Democracy Need Education?


Edward L. Glaeser


Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto


CREI - Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

April 2006

NBER Working Paper No. w12128

Abstract:     
Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic participation, it raises the support for more democratic regimes relative to dictatorships. This increases the likelihood of democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

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Date posted: May 15, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Glaeser, Edward L. and Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. and Shleifer, Andrei, Why Does Democracy Need Education? (April 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12128. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=896068

Contact Information

Edward L. Glaeser (Contact Author)
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Room 315A
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2150 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
CREI - Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2829 (Phone)
+34 93 542 2826 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/ponzetto/welcome.html
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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