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Designing Reputation (Feedback) Mechanisms

Chrysanthos Dellarocas
Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems

Federico Dini
Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.)

Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF; Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENT, Nicola Dimitri, Gustavo Piga, Giancarlo Spagnolo, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006

Abstract:     
Online "feedback mechanisms" - also known as "reputation systems" - have been implemented in the most important private e-markets, such as eBay, Yahoo!, Amazon to foster trust and cooperation among trading partners. In this paper we discuss the main issues relevant for the optimal design of such mechanisms, providing practical indications for public and private e-platforms.

Keywords: Procurement, reputation, feedback mechanisms

JEL Classifications: H57, D44, L14, L86

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: April 20, 2006 ; Last revised: June 13, 2006

Suggested Citation

Dellarocas, Chrysanthos N., Dini, Federico and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Designing Reputation (Feedback) Mechanisms. HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENT, Nicola Dimitri, Gustavo Piga, Giancarlo Spagnolo, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=896729


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Contact Information

Giancarlo Spagnolo (Contact Author)
University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )
Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy
+ 39 06 72595705 (Phone)
+ 39 06 2020500 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://WWW.GIANCA.ORG
EIEF ( email )
Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome 00187
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT
Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm Sweden
HOME PAGE: http://www2.hhs.se/SITE/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas
Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
Federico Dini
Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.) ( email )
00198 Roma Italy
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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