Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=897024
 
 

References (17)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Inadequacy of Nation-Based and Var-Based Safety Nets in the European Union


Edward J. Kane


Boston College - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

April 2006

NBER Working Paper No. w12170

Abstract:     
Considered as a social contract, a financial safety net imposes duties and confers rights on different sectors of the economy. Within a nation, elements of incompleteness inherent in this contract generate principal-agent conflicts that are mitigated by formal agreements, norms, laws, and the principle of democratic accountability. Across nations, additional gaps emerge that are hard to bridge. This paper shows that nationalistic biases and leeway in principles used to measure value-at-risk and bank capital make it unlikely that the crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution schemes incorporated in Basel II and EU Directives could allocate losses imbedded in troubled institutions efficiently or fairly across member nations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 17, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Kane, Edward J., Inadequacy of Nation-Based and Var-Based Safety Nets in the European Union (April 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12170. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=897024

Contact Information

Edward J. Kane (Contact Author)
Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )
Fulton Hall
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
520-299-5066 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 279
Downloads: 18
References:  17
Citations:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.265 seconds