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http://ssrn.com/abstract=899628
 
 

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Network Neutrality and Industry Structure


George S. Ford


Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Thomas Koutsky


Connected Nation Inc.

Lawrence J. Spiwak


Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

April 2006

Phoenix Center Policy Paper No. 24

Abstract:     
One of the most heated debates in the current efforts to re-write the Communications Act has been whether the federal government should impose "Network Neutrality" requirements on broadband service providers. While we argue neither for nor against the need for Network Neutrality legislation in this POLICY PAPER, our analysis shows that policymakers should avoid Network Neutrality mandates that have the intent or effect of "commoditizing" broadband access services since such a policy approach is likely to deter facilities-based competition, reduce the expansion and deployment of advanced communications networks, and increase prices. Given the economic characteristics of local communications networks, policies that promote commoditization of broadband access could lead to the monopoly provision of advanced broadband services in many markets. This outcome would harm consumers substantially.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Network Neutrality, Commoditization, Entry, Broadband

JEL Classification: K23, K29, L96, L98, L99, O33, O38

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Date posted: May 8, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Ford, George S. and Koutsky, Thomas and Spiwak, Lawrence J., Network Neutrality and Industry Structure (April 2006). Phoenix Center Policy Paper No. 24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=899628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.899628

Contact Information

George S. Ford
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
Thomas M. Koutsky
Connected Nation Inc. ( email )
1020 College St
Bowling Green, KY 42101
United States
Lawrence J. Spiwak (Contact Author)
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
202-274-0235 (Phone)
202-318-4909 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.phoenix-center.org
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