Delegation, Risk Diversification, and the Properly Political Project of Administrative Law
Daniel B. Rodriguez
Northwestern University - School of Law
Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 116, 2006
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-48
This essay replies to a recent article by Professor Matthew Stephenson, "Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice between Agencies and Courts," 119 Harvard Law Review 1035 (2006). In his article, Professor Stephenson develops a model to explain why and in what circumstances Congress delegates regulatory power to agencies rather than courts. This reply essentially picks up where Stephenson leaves off, considering more fully the relationship between Congressional instrument choice and the (oft neglected) political project of administrative law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
Keywords: administrative law, law and politics
JEL Classification: K1Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 4, 2006
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.453 seconds