|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Management of Knowledge WorkersHans K. HvideUniversity of Bergen - Department of Economics; University of Aberdeen - Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Eirik G. KristiansenNHH Norwegian School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics October 12, 2007 Abstract: We study how firm-specific complementary assets and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers in order to obtain positive profits. Moreover, firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but the higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Finally, our analysis suggests that strengthening firms' property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45 Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Innovation, IPP, Litigation, Personnel economics, R&D, Start-ups JEL Classification: J23, L00, K31, G00 working papers seriesDate posted: May 5, 2006 ; Last revised: April 13, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.562 seconds
