  |
|
|
||||
|
||||
How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions
R. Preston McAfee California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Daniel C. Quan Cornell University - School of Hotel Administration Daniel R. Vincent University of Maryland - Department of Economics Abstract: In a general auction model with affiliated signals, common components to valuations and endogenous entry, we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes, and derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price. This lower bound can be computed using data on past auctions combined with information about the subsequent sales prices of unsold goods. We illustrate how to compute the lower bound using data from real estate auctions.
Keywords: Auctions, Optimal Reserve Price, Real Estate JEL Classifications: D44 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: July 17, 2002 ; Last revised: July 17, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo2 in 0.141 seconds.
Download
Facebook
Twitter
Digg
Del.icio.us
CiteULike
