Financing a Portfolio of Projects
Holger M. Mueller
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
University of Frankfurt; Imperial College London
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group
Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
This paper shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. While competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage increases the investor's ex post bargaining position, it may nevertheless improve entrepreneurs' ex ante incentives. This is because projects funded by investors with shallow pockets must have not only a positive NPV at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. We also show that, besides mitigating moral hazard, committing to shallow pockets may have benefits in dealing with adverse selection problems. Our paper may help to understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund's initial capital and make it difficult to add on more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised. Our paper also provides a number of empirical implications, some of which have not yet been tested.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 54
JEL Classification: G32, G34, D82Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 16, 2006
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.438 seconds