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File name: SSRN-id901512. ; Size: 224K
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Public Enforcement of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
May 2006
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 322
Abstract:
This entry for the forthcoming The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Second Edition) surveys the economic analysis of public enforcement of law - the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first discuss the basic elements of the theory: the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions (fines, imprisonment), and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions, including the costs of imposing fines, mistake, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenses, and incapacitation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31
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Date posted: May 16, 2006
Suggested CitationPolinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, Public Enforcement of Law (May 2006). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 322. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901512 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.901512
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