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CEO Compensation and Board Structure


Vidhi Chhaochharia


University of Miami

Yaniv Grinstein


Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
September 10, 2008


Abstract:     
In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blockholder on the board and in affected firms with low concentration of institutional investors. Our results suggest that the new board requirements affected CEO compensation decisions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: CEO compensation, Board of Directors

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J33, J38

working papers series


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Date posted: May 17, 2006 ; Last revised: December 21, 2010

Suggested Citation

Chhaochharia, Vidhi and Grinstein, Yaniv, CEO Compensation and Board Structure (September 10, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.901642

Contact Information

Vidhi Chhaochharia (Contact Author)
University of Miami ( email )
514 Jenkins Building
Miami, FL 33124
United States
Yaniv Grinstein
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8686 (Phone)
607-254-4590 (Fax)
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