Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure
INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences
Sven E. Feldmann
Melbourne Business School
Business and Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002
This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems - the vote of confidence procedure - reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: information and lobbying, party coherence, coalition formationAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 17, 2006
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