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The Chameleon Effect: Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis for Cross-Listed Securities


Cally Jordan


Melbourne Law School; Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Transnational Legal Studies (London)

May 10, 2006


Abstract:     
This paper is based on a presentation made at the New York Stock Exchange Conference on the Future of Global Equity Trading, March 12, 2004, Sarasota, FL.

Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm? The dramatic increase in cross-listed securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the 1990s capital markets. The bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis was one of the more intriguing theories to surface to explain the phenomenon. Cross-listing, the hypothesis suggested, might be a bonding mechanism by which firms, incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection of minority shareholder rights or poor enforcement mechanisms, could voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement of the US markets in order to attract investors. By focusing on shareholder protection as key to cross-listing, the bonding hypothesis became inextricably linked to an important and influential body of academic work, the law and finance literature.

As intriguing as the bonding hypothesis is, this article argues that it offers only a partial explanation for the cross-listing phenomenon in the United States in the 1990s. Largely overlooked has been the main motor driving the exponential growth of cross-listings on the NYSE and NASDAQ in the 1990s: Canadian-based interlisted corporations (CBIs). CBIs form the largest single group of interlisted foreign corporations in the United States, by a huge margin, representing over 25% all interlistings on the NYSE, NMS-NASDAQ and AMEX in 2004. In fact, Canadian issuers form the largest single group of foreign private issuers (FPIs) in the United States, period. In 2004, there were nearly five times as many Canadian FPIs as the next largest national group, United Kingdom issuers.

The bonding hypothesis does not explain CBIs easily. CBIs do not come from a weak investor protection jurisdiction and, for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways, tend not to signal their entry into the US market. Rather than bonding, CBIs have been adroitly exploiting what financial economists have described as the home bias of US portfolio investors. CBIs have been, at least until very recently, chameleons, deliberately blending into the woodwork of the US markets.

This article will look at what makes CBIs different from most other interlisted companies and why the bonding hypothesis may not be explanatory of their behavior. In doing so, the article questions some of the underlying assumptions of the law and finance literature which supports the bonding hypothesis. Finally, the article considers implications of the CBI experience which may merit further consideration going forward.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: cross-listed securities, stock exchanges, bonding hypothesis, corporate governance, law and finance

JEL Classification: F30, G10, G30, K23, N20

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Date posted: May 17, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Jordan, Cally, The Chameleon Effect: Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis for Cross-Listed Securities (May 10, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901768 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.901768

Contact Information

Cally E. Jordan (Contact Author)
Melbourne Law School ( email )
Victoria, 3010
Australia
Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) ( email )
Level 7, UNSW CBD Campus
1 O'Connell Street
Sydney, NSW 2000
Australia

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Center for Transnational Legal Studies (London) ( email )
37-39 High Holborn St
Swan House
London, WC1V 6AA
United Kingdom
44 0203 077 5900 (Phone)
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