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Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis

Ehud Kamar
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Pinar Karaca-Mandic
RAND Corporation

Eric L. Talley
UC Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law; RAND Corporation; University of Southern California - Law School



USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-5
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 06-10
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 901769

Abstract:     
This article investigates whether the passage and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) drove firms out of the public capital market. To control for other factors affecting exit decisions, we examine the post-SOX change in the propensity of public American targets to be bought by private acquirers rather than public ones with the corresponding change for foreign targets, which were outside the purview of SOX. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that SOX induced small firms to exit the public capital market during the year following its enactment. In contrast, SOX appears to have had little effect on the going-private propensities of larger firms.

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley, Mergers, Going Private, Law and Finance, Securities Markets

JEL Classifications: G30, G34, G38, K22

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: May 12, 2006 ; Last revised: September 01, 2009

Suggested Citation

Kamar, Ehud, Karaca-Mandic, Pinar and Talley, Eric L., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (December 1, 2008). USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-5; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 06-10; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 901769. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769


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Contact Information

Ehud Kamar (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
(213) 740-4791 (Phone)
(213) 740-5502 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=225
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Pinar Karaca-Mandic
RAND Corporation ( email )
1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407
United States
Eric L. Talley
UC Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
(510) 642-7875 (Phone)
RAND Corporation
P.O. Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
United States
University of Southern California - Law School ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
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