SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (57)

Beta

 
 

Citations (4)

Beta

 


 



Choosing between Centralized and Decentralized Models of Tax Administration

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Andrey Timofeev
Georgia State University - International Studies Program


January 2005

Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 06-49

Abstract:     
The fundamental questions addressed in this paper are the following: what is the most appropriate approach to organizing the vertical structure of tax administration, and what are the determinant factors that may make an
approach more or less optimal in any particular country. We consider the theoretical arguments for and against centralized and decentralized models of tax administration and review the actual practices in a number of countries. The main conclusion is that one size does not fit all; the choices countries make in terms of their level of fiscal decentralization respond to complex agendas, which often involve political objectives. However, given the general approach to fiscal decentralization and, more in particular, revenue assignments, it is possible to identify better and worse approaches to organizing tax administration.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 12, 2006 ; Last revised: May 12, 2006

Suggested Citation

Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Timofeev, Andrey, Choosing between Centralized and Decentralized Models of Tax Administration (January 2005). Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 06-49. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=901821


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (Contact Author)
Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )
University Plaza
PO Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States
404-651-3990 (Phone)
404-651-3996 (Fax)
Andrey Timofeev
Georgia State University - International Studies Program ( email )
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States
+1 404 413-0230 (Phone)
+1 404 413-0244 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/people/timofeev.html

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 660
Downloads: 122
Download Rank: 71,083
References: 57
Citations: 4

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apollo1 in 0.141 seconds.