Trash It or Sell It? A Strategic Analysis of the Market Introduction of Product Innovations
University of Bielefeld - Department of Business Administration and Economics
University of Graz
Vienna University of Technology
In this paper a quantity-setting duopoly is considered where one firm develops a new product which is horizontally differentiated from the existing product. The main question examined is which strategically important effects occur if the decision to develop the innovation and the decision to introduce the new product in the market are separated. In our multi-stage game the firm's launch decision is explicitly taken into account and we find an equilibrium where the competitor of the potential innovator strategically over-invests in process innovation. In this equilibrium the competitor over-invests in order to push the potential innovator to introduce the new product since this reduces the competition for the existing product. It is shown that this effect has positive welfare implications in comparison with the case where the innovator commits ex ante to launching the new product.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42
Keywords: product/process innovation, market introduction, innovation incentives
JEL Classification: L13, O31working papers series
Date posted: July 17, 2008
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