Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=902065
 
 

Footnotes (124)



 


 



Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication


Christopher J. Peters


University of Baltimore - School of Law


Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 96, p. 1, 2001

Abstract:     
This article, which has been published in slightly revised form at 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (2001), is an application and extension of my theory of adjudication as representation, which holds that the procedural elements of litigant participation and interest representation confer democratic legitimacy on court decisions. In the article, I first develop the notion of a "majoritarian difficulty": the often-ignored tension between democratic self-rule and majority domination of the political minority. Second, I offer a model of majoritarianism as a type of adjudication, in which interested parties lobby for favorable decisions by a neutral decisionmaker. Third, I contend that the majoritarian difficulty can be mitigated or resolved by understanding majority decisions as the products of meaningful participation, through persuasion, by both the winning and the losing parties. Finally, I use the model to explain two central claims of contemporary deliberative democratic theory: that a deliberative conception of politics is superior to a purely aggregative conception, and that public deliberation must proceed according to reasons that are acceptable to all the participants.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: adjudication, majority rule, democracy, judicial review, deliberative democracy, Rawls, Madison, countermajoritarian difficulty

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: May 17, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Peters, Christopher J., Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication. Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 96, p. 1, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=902065

Contact Information

Christopher J. Peters (Contact Author)
University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States
410-837-4509 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://law.ubalt.edu
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 615
Downloads: 63
Download Rank: 213,587
Footnotes:  124

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.250 seconds