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The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors

James S. Linck
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance

Jeffry M. Netter
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance

Tina Yang
Villanova University


February 4, 2008

AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper
FMA Online, Vol. #, No. #, Year

Abstract:     
Using 8,000 public companies we study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and other contemporary reforms on directors and boards, guided by their impact on the supply and demand for directors. SOX increased director workload and risk (reducing the supply), and increased demand by mandating that firms have more outside directors. We find both broad-based changes and cross-sectional changes (by firm size). Board committees meet more often post SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums doubled. Directors post SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX boards are larger and more independent. Finally, we find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among smaller firms.

Keywords: Board, board discretion, board function, board reform, corporate governance, director liability, independent director, regulation

JEL Classifications: D23, G32, G34, G38, K22, M14

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 23, 2005 ; Last revised: February 06, 2008

Suggested Citation

Linck, James S., Netter, Jeffry M. and Yang, Tina, The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors (February 4, 2008). AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper; FMA Online, Vol. #, No. #, Year. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=902665 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.687496


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Contact Information

James S. Linck (Contact Author)
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )
Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States
706-542-3646 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.terry.uga.edu/profiles/?person_id=496
Jeffry M. Netter
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )
Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States
706-542-3654 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/facultyprofiles/n
Tina Yang
Villanova University ( email )
School of Business
800 Lancaster Avenue
Villanova, PA 19085
United States
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