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Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate

Justin Wolfers
University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Kiel Institute for the World Economy

John J. Donohue III
Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


February 2006

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5493

Abstract:     
Does the death penalty save lives? A surge of recent interest in this question has yielded a series of papers purporting to show robust and precise estimates of a substantial deterrent effect of capital punishment. We assess the various approaches that have been used in this literature, testing the robustness of these inferences. Specifically, we start by assessing the time series evidence, comparing the history of executions and homicides in the United States and Canada, and within the United States, between executing and non-executing states. We analyse the effects of the judicial experiments provided by the Furman and Gregg decisions and assess the relationship between execution and homicide rates in state panel data since 1934. We then revisit the existing instrumental variables approaches and assess two recent state-specific execution moratoria. In each case we find that previous inferences of large deterrent effects based upon specific samples, functional forms, control variables, comparison groups, or IV strategies are extremely fragile and even small changes in specifications yield dramatically different results. The fundamental difficulty is that the death penalty - at least as it has been implemented in the United States - is applied so rarely that the number of homicides that it can plausibly have caused or deterred cannot be reliably disentangled from the large year-to-year changes in the homicide rate caused by other factors. As such, short samples and particular specifications may yield large but spurious correlations. We conclude that existing estimates appear to reflect a small and unrepresentative sample of the estimates that arise from alternative approaches. Sampling from the broader universe of plausible approaches suggests not just 'reasonable doubt' about whether there is any deterrent effect of the death penalty, but profound uncertainty - even about its sign.

Keywords: Capital punishment, crime, death penalty, deterrence, execution, homicide, murder

JEL Classifications: K14, K42

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 19, 2006 ; Last revised: May 19, 2006

Suggested Citation

Wolfers, Justin and Donohue, John J., Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate (February 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5493. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=903406


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Contact Information

Justin Wolfers (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org/~jwolfers
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/personnel/photos/index_html?key=1737
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/researchers/details/rschcontact.asp?IDENT=157943
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
101 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.frbsf.org/economics/economists/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
DE-81679 Munich Germany
Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( email )
P.O. Box 4309
Kiel D-24100
Germany
John J. Donohue III
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-1994 (Phone)
203-432-1040 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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