Stock Market Regulation in the Pacific Basin: Lessons from U.S. Experience
Michael S. Rozeff
SUNY at Buffalo - Department of Financial & Managerial Economics
Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Research, Vol. 1, 1990
This paper surveys some of the prevalent theories of stock market regulation (market failure and public choice.) The validity of generalizing U.S. regulatory experience to the markets of other nations depends on which, if any, of these popular theories holds. No convincing evidence exists to support market failure. Hence, the scientific basis for generalizing U.S. experience to other markets is limited. The negative lesson is that imitation of U.S. regulation does not necessarily improve the general welfare. Observed regulation depends on interest groups. Not only is there no ideal model to follow, but no such ideal exists. The paper reviews important phenomena that any positive theory of regulation is confronted with. It provides detailed criticisms of the SEC and reviews Benston's strong critique of mandatory disclosure.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: stock market regulation, SEC, mandatory disclosure, market failure, public choice theory
JEL Classification: K22, G28, G38Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 23, 2006
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.375 seconds