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The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition EconomiesNauro F. CamposBrunel University - Economics and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - The William Davidson Institute; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Francesco GiovannoniUniversity of Bristol - Department of Economics August 2005 William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 786 Abstract: During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38 Keywords: Asset stripping, law enforcement, corruption, transition JEL Classification: H82, K42, O17, P26, P31 working papers seriesDate posted: May 23, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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