Gambling By Auctions
Claremont Colleges - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance
Rotman School of Management
April 17, 2007
We provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a selling mechanism used by an Internet web-site that combines important features of auctions and gambling. This is the first analysis of such a selling mechanism, which provides insights into how the two kinds of behavior might be related in real life. The winner of the object is the bidder with the highest bid not submitted by any other bidder. In the equilibrium of our game theoretical model, each bid yields the same probability of winning. Bidders are more likely to submit higher bids, and the bid distribution does not depend on the value of the object or the highest bid allowed if one controls for the number of bidders. These key theoretical predictions are confirmed by the data.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: auctions, lottery, charity
JEL Classification: D44, C72, C12working papers series
Date posted: June 1, 2006
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.297 seconds