Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=905606
 
 

References (8)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Gambling By Auctions


Yaron Raviv


Claremont Colleges - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance

Gabor Virag


Rotman School of Management

April 17, 2007


Abstract:     
We provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a selling mechanism used by an Internet web-site that combines important features of auctions and gambling. This is the first analysis of such a selling mechanism, which provides insights into how the two kinds of behavior might be related in real life. The winner of the object is the bidder with the highest bid not submitted by any other bidder. In the equilibrium of our game theoretical model, each bid yields the same probability of winning. Bidders are more likely to submit higher bids, and the bid distribution does not depend on the value of the object or the highest bid allowed if one controls for the number of bidders. These key theoretical predictions are confirmed by the data.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: auctions, lottery, charity

JEL Classification: D44, C72, C12

working papers series


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Date posted: June 1, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Raviv, Yaron and Virag, Gabor, Gambling By Auctions (April 17, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=905606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.905606

Contact Information

Yaron Raviv (Contact Author)
Claremont Colleges - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )
500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States
909-607-7305 (Phone)
Gabor Virag
Rotman School of Management ( email )
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G8
Canada
416-978-4423 (Phone)
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References:  8
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