Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=905612
 
 

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Did the Soviets Collude? A Statistical Analysis of Championship Chess 1940-64


Charles C. Moul


Miami University

John V. Nye


George Mason University - Department of Economics; National Research University Higher School of Economics

May 1, 2006


Abstract:     
We expand the set of outcomes considered by the tournament literature to include draws and use games from post-war chess tournaments to see whether strategic behavior is important in such scenarios. In particular, we examine whether players from the former Soviet Union acted as a cartel in international tournaments - intentionally drawing against one another in order to focus effort on non-Soviet opponents - to maximize the chance of some Soviet winning. Using data from international qualifying tournaments as well as USSR national tournaments, we estimate models to test for collusion. Our results are consistent with Soviet draw-collusion and inconsistent with Soviet competition. Simulations of the period's five premier international competitions (the FIDE Candidates tournaments) suggest that the observed Soviet sweep was a 75%-probability event under collusion but only a 25%-probability event had the Soviet players not colluded.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Tournaments, Collusion, Chess

JEL Classification: J3

working papers series





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Date posted: June 1, 2006 ; Last revised: February 18, 2014

Suggested Citation

Moul, Charles C. and Nye, John V., Did the Soviets Collude? A Statistical Analysis of Championship Chess 1940-64 (May 1, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=905612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.905612

Contact Information

Charles C. Moul (Contact Author)
Miami University ( email )
Farmer School of Business
Oxford, OH 45056
United States
John V. C. Nye
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-4272 (Phone)
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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