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Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions

Alexandra Natapoff
Loyola Law School Los Angeles



Golden Gate University Law Review, 2006
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-17

Abstract:     
There is increasing evidence that our criminal system often convicts the innocent. Criminal informants, or "snitches," play a prominent role in this wrongful conviction phenomenon. The criminal system, however, is heavily dependent on snitches, particularly in connection with the investigation and prosecution of drug offenses, and police and prosecutors are often not well-positioned to know when their informants are lying. This Comment, which was prepared in connection with the ACLU of Northern California's conference on wrongful convictions, describes the institutional relationships between snitches, police, and prosecutors that makes snitch falsehoods so pervasive and difficult to discern with the traditional tools of the adversarial process. It offers a litigation suggestion for providing a judicial check on the use of unreliable informant witnesses, namely, a Daubert-style pre-trial reliability hearing. The Appendix provides a sample motion requesting and justifying such a hearing.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: June 01, 2006 ; Last revised: September 25, 2006

Suggested Citation

Natapoff, Alexandra, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions. Golden Gate University Law Review, 2006; Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=905864


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Contact Information

Alexandra Natapoff (Contact Author)
Loyola Law School Los Angeles ( email )
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
United States
213-736-8397 (Phone)
213-380-3769 (Fax)
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